safes and contract theory: gaps and loopholes
trying to understand how the market safe, I began to see its structure and how the institutions determine current performance. There are very little to read the topic, at least in conversational tones and not so legal. Notwithstanding the above, I shall try to represent in a simple, from what little I saw, the market follows.
The "supply side" of this market consists of banks, the demand side we have the customers, the bank lends them a service in return for monetary compensation takes the form, say, a newspaper subscription. This is formalized by a contract .
One aspect nontrivial safety boxes is that unlike the other services provided by banks in our country the regulatory framework that encompasses this activity is somewhat atypical, as there is no point to this operative legislation. This legal vacuum or loophole "is solved by resorting to other sources of law and comparative law, analogy, and so on. In this case, the activity falls within the orbit corresponding to any contract between private (ie, the corner grocer may offer a safe deposit box).
From the standpoint of legal-contractual agreement establishes a set of actions to which each party agrees, to a significant extent the results arising from compliance (or lack thereof) of the same. According to Russo , the duties of banks include:
- "allow the client-or person expressly authorized" access to safe banking day within the authorized time, so tailored to the security and control guidelines set by the entity, and allow access to the quiet place to perform the operation on privacy;
- " ensure the suitability of the premises and the integrity of the box and its contents. For these purposes, should permanently keep the boxes to prevent damage or violation of same in order to preserve its integrity ;
- " where appropriate, compensate customers for damage suffered damage or loss of deposited objects. This point arises from the contractual nature of the duty of custody, as we have discussed, is the soul of the contract. "
While customers are required to provide:
- "pay the price set by the bank;
- " use the box as agreed in the contract, which means: do not store dangerous substances, respect the rules of the institution in terms of security, etc. "
An important point is, of course, how to define the scope of responsibility banks in relation to the occurrence of certain contingencies or claims, or what is the same as what the true nature of the contract. On the one hand, emphasizing the role of surveillance and security of value given, a current doctrine resembles the contract in question to deposit contracts and therefore should govern the regulatory framework of a standard tank. The logical problem that has this doctrine is that the bank can not keep things straight it does not know who actually owns.
Moreover, proponents of the theory of location argue that the bank is limited to ensure the client exclusive use of a safe, under the circumstances of confidentiality and discretion it deserves the case. That is, the bank is not obliged to keep safe and has no interest in the use or destination of the contents thereof. However, this doctrine loses sight of the nature of the service " safe."
A third component, which predominates in the local case, takes elements from both schools and considers these contracts as a typology "sui generis ", which features location and deposit .
However, making an economic reading of the controversy, we can surmise that the first stream is associated with high transaction costs (ie, the bank does not know that in the box are the jewels of the grandmother, can be expensive for me to prove that the jewels were actually there until the time of the incident, and although able to convince the bank and a "neutral third party 'that the jewels were actually there, still not entirely clear what the value of same, etc.).
respect to the second current, that is not obvious is what is the scope of the provision of 'vigilance' required by the bank that is not considered a breach of contract: the contractual requirement of custody and supervision should be materialized in terms of means (4 police officers case, given quality steel, etc.) or results (or yes ensure the safe state)?
the accident, the timing of the game can be summarized as follows.
i) The box is violated, then there is a breach of contract by the bank;
ii) the client can "complete" the contract using an external arbitration (in this case to court), but it is a course of action as mentioned has high transaction costs and can take time;
iii ) as a form of settlement between the parties, the bank offers a fixed amount of compensation as 'safe', provided that the client undertakes not to resort to justice.
Given the above, the reflections that arise are the following.
a) what features are the "clients" of this market? That is, what is their motivation to allocate assets to this use "passive"? In addition to insecurity, a determinant of individual demand may be unable to access other financial instruments problems with the IRS. If you can not whitewash what's in the box, do not be left other than the fixed amount.
b) if you stole the jewels of the grandmother and worth less than the fixed amount (which a priori seems unlikely), you also should be fixed.
c) if the jewels were worth more than the fixed amount, you may even agree to accept given the uncertainty that you are exposed to the trial.
d) so I say the market for safes in Buenos Aires is saturated, but due to logistics and intelligence developed boqueteros even could have hired some safes then violently, and take also the value of the insurance ... even though it sounds trite.
Which brings me to the following question: comparing the cost, insurance and the probability of gap against having things in the house and robbed me what is the optimal value to deposit in the safe?